Framework for Fairness Agreement (or: How I Learned to Stop Worrying and Love the Bomb)

‘Framework for Fairness Agreement’: Certainly sounds very nice, perhaps conjures up images of long-outstanding wrongs finally righted, through civil and polite negotiation. However, since it is supposed to apply to the rough-and-tumble world of ‘labour relations’, i.e. front lines of the class war, it’s a bit useless (to the point of being a major fuck-up for the labour movement in general).Luckily, Bruce Allen (VP of CAW Local 199) has written an analysis of the recent Framework for Fairness Agreement (FFA) between the Canadian Auto Workers and Magna International for New Socialist website that bears reading. I, of course, have my own list of criticisms of the garbage agreement.

The FFA is essentially an agreement that sets out a method and framework (hence the name) for the unionization of the entire Magna autoparts company, with serious limitations on the rights of members. Many people have commented on this news story, and it has been easily the biggest labour-news story of 2007. Labor Notes also has an excellent analysis of the situation here, and the actual text of the agreement (for those of you who like to do ‘primary research’..) can be found here.

The Labor Notes article sums up the restrictions on the union organized under the agreement:

Each shop, some of which employ more than 1,500 workers, would have only one union representative. Called an employee advocate—a term lifted from Magna’s non-union jointness structure—the representative would be selected by the CAW’s assistant to the president from a pool recommended by a “fairness committee.” That committee, another tool of the current labor-management collaboration scheme, is split between 51 percent union members and 49 percent management and non-union workers.

Members would be unable to either vote for or oust their representative for three years. Among the responsibilities of the employee advocate is to “work with all parties to develop continuous improvement ideas to make the division more competitive.”

The union members on the fairness committee are not allowed to act as stewards, and are required to have good disciplinary records and a commitment to the Magna Employee Charter in order to run.

There are so many, many things wrong the situation described that it is almost incomprehensible. These ‘Employee Advocates’ are such a butchery of what a shop steward is that they will be an utter disaster for any workplace that is ‘organized’ under this pathetic agreement. Hired, not elected, by the so-called ‘Fairness Committee’, the top three candidates for EA must be approved by the Assistant to the CAW President (not of the Local, but of the entire union!). The de facto control of the pseudo-steward system by the highest echelon of the union bureaucracy does not bode well for the union; democratically-elected stewards were (to me at least) always a shining example of how the CAW was better than other Canadian unions. I have been in a union where the stewards are appointed; it is far from the only thing a union needs to be internally healthy (and as a result able to exert its power externally), but is crucial nonetheless. I simply cannot wrap my head around why any self-respecting unionist would not only agree to, but wholeheartedly endorse the effective selection of an employee representative by a committee involving management.

The entire agreement is full of mind-blowingly bad ideas such as the EAs. Every time I read through it, I find something new that infuriates me; I think a marked-up (commented upon) version of the FFA might be something I do in the near future.

As for the agreement itself, the CAW leadership is saying they pursued this monstrosity to increase union density in the sector, by introducing a new ‘type’ of union that Capital is more willing to recognize and work with. However, as Allen correctly points out,

At what price will this be achieved and with what consequences? One must also ask what kind of a labour movement would result?

One thing is painfully obvious. The CAW’s agreement with Magna is a product of the increasing weakness and failures of the leadership of organized labour in Canada . This is particularly so in Ontario where the manufacturing sector and Magna’s operations are concentrated.

He posits three things that highlight these weaknesses: the absence of card-check, anti-scab, and strong plant closure legislation in Ontario. Insomuch as the absence of these three are indicators of the weakness of the organized working-class’ political strength in the province, I agree with him; however, he goes on to say

If workers had had the benefit of all three things the ongoing decline in union density would never have developed. Union power would be as formidable as it ever was. It logically follows that winning all three of these things would facilitate a resurgence of union density and union power by facilitating successful organizing drives at places like Magna. This would also be true in non-unionized service sector workplaces.

While I would be the first person to argue labour needs to mobilize and fight for all three of these, I don’t think the attainment of them would result in a resurgent working class. Several provinces already have some of these; Quebec has an anti-scab law, but it’s relatively stronger union militancy (as compared to the rest-of-Canada) is the cause, not the effect of this; Manitoba has card-check legislation, but it has had not much impact on the unionization rates in the province (although the incredibly high threshold of 65% required does explain some of that). They would, of course, have significant material benefit to the working class, and would go a long way to blunting capital’s impact on workers, but they would not create the political drive within the working class that needs to be realized if genuine change is to happen. The mobilization to obtain those protections would be the ultimate benefit. This section is not that important to the overall scope of the article, and is largely the only area I disagree with Allen on. I do agree wholeheartedly with Allen on one point:

Furthermore, it is very telling that there are currently no serious, ongoing efforts to achieve any of these three badly needed labour law changes favouring workers. This exemplifies how the union bureaucracy rarely even attempts to mobilize workers to wage political fights for specific legislative changes very clearly in workers’ interests and rarely attempt anything more than timid lobbying efforts.

He goes on to connect this with the repugnant toadying of the top CAW leadership with what should be political enemies, such as Ontario Premier Dalton McGuinty and former PM Paul Martin – a.k.a Jacketgate (I won’t, however, condemn Hargrove and the CAW for being wary of the NDP¹). Allen quite rightly argues the FFA means the “CAW is willingly sinking even deeper into the quicksand of embracing labour–management cooperation policies and further abandoning an adversarial relationship toward Capital”. The CAW, of course, calls this a ‘foot in the door’ strategy – but the agreement CAW has made (by signing the FFA) will hamstring any future successes in developing union consciousness at the Magna plants. I fail to see how getting the union’s foot in the door, so to speak, will be of any use when the union and the company actually disagree on something during contract negotiations and there is no real way to resolve it. The creation of the FFA means the CAW leadership and Magna have already written key portions of whatever collective bargaining agreement comes out of this fiasco; the FFA’s solution for the inevitable (and you don’t have to be a Marxist to appreciate that they will be inevitable) disagreements between the union and the company is to send it to an arbitrator. However, what the union stands to lose by doing this is the working-class’ ultimate weapon: the strike. The inability of the union to alter the FFA through what it so condescendingly calls ‘labour action’ means it will likely never fundamentally change. I’m sure the arbitrator will rule on the union’s behalf occasionally, but relying on an arbitrator for every disagreement about the contract will result in a union membership who expects to be serviced, not to fight for their collective interests.

Allen makes an excellent point I hadn’t considered: this corporatist framework will likely lead to the next generation of CAW leaders learning what it means to be a union member sitting in committees with management hacks, reading ‘key metrics’ and discussing how best to maximize company profit; we could conceivably see a CAW president who has never been in a strike – after all, they are banned under the FFA. The next generation of CAW leaders that will come out of Magna plants will simply not be real trade unionists – and the corporatist vision they have will infect the rest of the union like a virus. So much for Buzz Hargrove, unrepentant socialist.

Allen finishes by discusses the internal debate within the CAW on the FFA; disturbingly, “many of those who spoke in favour of the Magna Agreement were appointed members of CAW staff,” and some delegates from one large (unnamed) local that were planning to speak against it were warned not to by the local President. Now, I’m not entirely against the idea of staff participating in democratic meetings such as this; I have participated in similar meetings in a staff position, and I think staff can bring a unique perspective to debate. However, the role of staff in democratic organizations (especially unions) should always take a back seat to the members, and it does appear in this instance to be a more-or-less coordinated effort at neutralizing opposition within the staff ranks and as part of a broader effort to neutralize opposition within the CAW Council. The CAW members who attended the Council meeting are not blameless, although I obviously recognize the effects of a bureaucratized union elite on internal union democracy; hopefully the left within the union can organize a fightback against this highly unfortunate development.

¹ Certainly the abomination that was the Rae government (and many other provincial NDP governments) gave the labour movement reason to be wary. I believe that a good deal of the backlash against Hargrove for Jacketgate was less about him supporting a Liberal (odious as that may be) and more about a knee-jerk reaction against him not supporting the NDP.